

Recessions, Social Security and Retirement

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Introduction

- Social Security accounts for more than 50% of income for 2/3 of retirees, almost 100% of income for 1/3 of elderly households
- 3 main incentives affect retirement decision
 - ▶ Substitution effect: year of work $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ tax contribution \uparrow , benefits \uparrow or $\downarrow \Rightarrow$ LF participation \uparrow or \downarrow
 - ▶ Wealth effect: assuming leisure is normal good, \uparrow SS benefit \Rightarrow LF participation \downarrow
 - ▶ Liquidity effect: cannot borrow against SS \Rightarrow LF participation \uparrow or \downarrow
- **This project:** Model retirement decision to conduct policy experiments such as shift in NRA

- Question: **what is the effect of Social Security benefit on labor supply of older workers?**
- Approach:
 1. Empirical model to estimate intensive and extensive margin of older workers' labor supply
 - ▶ SS benefit is a function of year of birth
 - ▶ RDD: exploit the discontinuous relationship between date of birth and benefits at the boundary (Jan 2 vs. Jan 1)
 2. Structural model to understand mechanism through which labor supply responds to changes in SS pension rules; policy experiments
- Results (using public data):
 - ▶ Labor supply responds to changes in SS benefits

Motivation: how does SS work?

$$Benefit_i = PIA_i^b \times DRC^b \times \prod_{j=b+62}^t COLA_j$$


where

- ▶ PIA (Primary Insurance Amount) - benefit amount if retire at NRA; depends on lifetime earnings and economy wage at age of 60
- ▶ DRC (Delayed Retirement Credit) - depends on benefit claiming date; amount was changing over time for several cohorts
- ▶ COLA (Cost-of-living Adjustment) - inflation adjustment, applied only after age of 62

▶ Details


Motivation: How important is YOB?

- Consider 2 workers:
 - ▶ Alice born in Jan of year b , Bob born in Dec of year $b - 1$
 - ▶ Alice and Bob have identical history of earnings, retire at same age



1. **SS public use files:** SSA public benefit file + SSA public earnings file
 - Sample: 1% anonymized extract from SSA records that provides year of birth, sex, benefit amount for the year 2004, annual wages from 1951 to 2003
 - Focus on people born in 1922 or later, who receive only retirement benefits based on AIME (no spouse benefits, no dual benefits) yields 193,214 individuals
2. **Health and Retirement Survey:** nationally representative bi-annual panel survey of Americans aged 50+ and their spouses (starting from cohort of 1931)
 - Contains variables associated with retirement such as self-reported retirement date, hours worked per week, retirement income including SS and demographic characteristics
 - Can be linked to SS earnings history: access pending

SSA EPUF Data: Actual vs. Counterfactual Changes



- y-axis: annual % difference in benefits between cohort b and $b - 1$
- x-axis: counterfactual % difference implied by SS benefit formula assuming two identical earners born in b and $b - 1$
 - ▶ SS formula explains significant portion of cohort benefit differences

Public Data: Effect of SS Benefit on Labor Supply

$$\text{Total Income} = \underbrace{\{\text{Average Income} | \text{Income} > 0\}}_{\text{intensive margin}} \times \underbrace{\{\# \text{ of years with Income} > 0\}}_{\text{extensive margin}}$$

$$\log(Y_i) = \alpha + \beta \log(\text{Ben}_i) + \gamma \mathbb{1}\{\text{male}\}_i + \sum_{j=1}^{10} \delta_j \mathbb{1}\{\text{Inc}_i \in \text{bin}_j\} + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

- ▶ Y_i - dependent variable: Total Income, Average Income if Income > 0, # of years with Income > 0 between ages 61 and 70
- ▶ Ben_i - i 's SS benefit
- ▶ $\mathbb{1}\{\text{male}\}_i$ - equals 1 if i is a male
- ▶ $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Inc}_i \in \text{bin}_j\}$ - equals 1 if i total earnings between ages 56 and 60 belong to the income decile j
- All dollar figures are in real 2012 dollars
- Instrument Ben_i by YOB dummy

$$\log(Y_i) = \alpha + \beta \log(\text{Ben}_i) + \gamma \mathbb{1}\{\text{male}\}_i + \sum_{j=1}^{10} \delta_j \mathbb{1}\{\text{Inc}_i \in \text{bin}_j\} + \varepsilon_i$$

Y	Total Inc		Average Inc		# of yrs with Inc > 0	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\log(\text{Ben})$	-0.112 (0.246)	-0.601** (0.282)	-0.812*** (0.220)	-0.827*** (0.210)	0.700*** (0.117)	0.225 (0.144)
$\mathbb{1}\{\text{male}\}$	0.223** (0.076)	-0.030 (0.049)	0.451*** (0.067)	0.040 (0.037)	-0.228*** (0.036)	-0.070** (0.025)
past inc controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
FS F_{st}	20.22	25.04	20.22	25.04	20.22	25.04
FS R^2	0.12	0.54	0.12	0.54	0.12	0.54

$N = 77,545$, standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

- Elasticity of earnings with respect to the benefits is -0.6
- Labor supply is responsive on intensive margin: elasticity of average earnings is -0.8

Additional Control: Business Cycle Around Retirement

- Estimates are unbiased if excluded determinants of labor supply are uncorrelated with YOB
- Labor market conditions around retirement affect decision to retire
 - ▶ add $u_{i,R-1}$ to the list of controls - aggregate unemployment rate in a year before i 's retirement
- Measures of R
 1. Age of benefit claiming
 2. Age at which $w_{it} > 0$ switches to $w_{it} = 0$ and does not increase
 3. Age at which $w_{it} \geq 2,500$ switches to $w_{it} < 2,500$ and does not increase

$$\log(Y_i) = \alpha + \beta \log(\text{Ben}_i) + \gamma \mathbb{1}\{\text{male}\}_i + \sum_{j=1}^{10} \delta_j \mathbb{1}\{\text{Inc}_i \in \text{bin}_j\} + \zeta u_{i,R-1} + \varepsilon_i$$

Y	Total Inc (1)	Average Inc (2)	# of yrs with Inc > 0 (3)	1-PR (4)
Measure of R: Claiming Age, N=77,545				
$\log(\text{Ben})$	-0.280 (0.203)	-1.167*** (0.170)	0.887*** (0.118)	-0.516*** (0.054)
Measure of R: Age at which $\{w_{it} = 0\}$, N=58,265				
$\log(\text{Ben})$	-1.385*** (0.267)	-0.101 (0.185)	-1.284*** (0.159)	0.624*** (0.070)
Measure of R: Age at which $\{w_{it} < 2500\}$, N=62,274				
$\log(\text{Ben})$	-2.305*** (0.291)	-1.056*** (0.206)	-1.248*** (0.158)	0.598*** (0.070)

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

- Labor supply is responsive on extensive margin: 1 st. dev. benefits \uparrow is associated with retiring ≈ 2.4 years earlier

SSA data: Effect of SS Benefit on Labor Supply

$$\text{Total Income} = \underbrace{\{\text{Average Income} | \text{Income} > 0\}}_{\text{intensive margin}} \times \underbrace{\{\# \text{ of years with Income} > 0\}}_{\text{extensive margin}}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \log(Y_i) = & \alpha + \beta \log(\text{Ben}_i) + \gamma \text{RA}_i + \delta u_{i,R-1} + \zeta \text{RA}_i \times u_{i,R-1} \\ & + \sum_{j=1}^5 \eta_j \mathbb{1}\{\text{Inc}_i \in \text{bin}_j\} + X_i \Gamma + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Y_i - dependent variable: Total Income, Average Income if Income > 0, # of years with Income > 0 between ages 61 and 70
- ▶ Ben_i - sum of i 's SS benefit between ages 61 and 70
- ▶ RA_i - i 's retirement age (age at which earnings decline to less than 50% of lifetime maximum annual earnings)
- ▶ $u_{i,R-1}$ - unemployment in the year before i 's retirement
- ▶ X_i - i 's gender, race, education level, lifetime earnings at age 55
- ▶ $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Inc}_i \in \text{bin}_j\}$ - income quintile dummy

$$\log(Y_i) = \alpha + \beta \log(\text{Ben}_i) + \gamma \text{RA}_i + \delta u_{i,R-1} + \zeta \text{RA}_i \times u_{i,R-1} + \sum_{j=1}^5 \eta_j \mathbb{1}\{\text{Inc}_i \in \text{bin}_j\} + X_i \Gamma + \varepsilon_i$$

- All dollar figures are in real 1984 dollars, except benefits
- Instrument Ben_i by YOB and MOB dummies
- SE are clustered on DOB level

Y	Total Inc	Average Inc	# of yrs with Inc > 0
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\log(\text{Ben}_i)$	-0.751*** (0.177)	-0.572*** (0.143)	-0.192*** (0.048)
$u_{i,R-1}$	-1.336*** (0.222)	-0.325* (0.170)	0 (0.013)
$\text{RA}_i \times u_{i,R-1}$	0.020*** (0.032)	0.005** (0.024)	0.0004*** (0.0001)

$N = 2,514$, standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Conclusion and Next Steps

- **Conclusion:** labor supply is responsive to SS benefits
- Next step
 - ▶ Model with savings and uncertainty to conduct policy experiments such as shift in NRA

Motivation: how does SS work?

Step 1. Let w_{it} be earnings by i in year t

$$y_{it}^b = \begin{cases} w_{it} \frac{AWI_{b+60}}{AWI_t}, & t \leq b + 60 \\ w_{it}, & t > b + 60 \end{cases} \Rightarrow AIME_i^b = \frac{1}{35 \times 12} \sum_{t \in i\text{'s best 35 years}} y_{it}^b$$

Step 2. k_1^b, k_2^b - kink points: $k_1^b = 180 \frac{AWI_{b+60}}{AWI_{1977}}, k_2^b = 1085 \frac{AWI_{b+60}}{AWI_{1977}}$




FIGURE 1. PRIMARY INSURANCE AMOUNT AS A FUNCTION OF AVERAGE INDEXED MONTHLY EARNINGS

Step 3. COLA (wage inflation)

$$COLA_t = \max \left(\frac{CPI_t}{\max_{\tau < t} CPI_\tau}, 1 \right)$$

Step 4 DRC (delayed retirement credit)

$$Benefit_{it} = PIA_i^b \times DRC^b \times \prod_{j=b+62}^t COLA_j$$